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DUE PROCESS
fails to subsidize [the] abortion."'37 The program still provides an
eligible woman with services after the abortion;38 terminating the
pregnancy does not terminate the eligibility for service and
care.3 9
In addition to rejecting the plaintiffs' due process and equal
protection claims, the court briefly and concisely rejected the
plaintiffs assertions that the statute violated the Aid to the Needy
and Public Health Clauses of the New York State Constitution
because it failed to provide for medically necessary abortions
without regard to the woman's financial or medical needs. 40 The
court of appeals reiterated that PCAP recipients are not indigent,
nor in need of medical assistance 41 and that the statute's purpose
is to combat infant mortality. 42 Rejecting these claims, the court
reversed the order of the appellate division.
The court of appeals concluded that the PCAP statute is
constitutional under both New York and Federal Constitutions
because it is rationally related to the Legislature's objective of
pre-,enting infant mortality by providing prenatal and .post
pregnancy care for low income women. 43
People v. Baxley 4
(decided June 30, 1994)
Defendant claimed that his criminal convictions were obtained
in violation of his statutory rights under New York Criminal
Procedure Law [hereinafter CPL] section 440.1045 and his
37. Id.
38. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2521.
39. Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 577, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
40. Id. at 577-78, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
41. Id. at 578, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 X.Y..S.2d at 816.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 84 N.Y.2d 208, 639 N.E.2d 746, 616 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1994).
45. N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW. § 440.10 (McKinney 1994). This provision
reads in pertinent part:
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federal4 6 constitutional right to due process. Under section
440.10, the defendant implicitly asserted a violation of his due
process rights under the New York State Constitution as well. 47
The defendant claimed that his motion to vacate the judgment
should be granted because the prosecution failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence, thereby depriving him of a fair trial.4 8 The
New York Court of Appeals held that both the supreme court and
appellate division abused their discretion, as a matter of law, in
denying defendant's motion without a hearing. 4 9 The court of
appeals held that the record contained insufficient facts to
determine if a violation had occurred; thus, it remanded the case
to the supreme court for an evidentiary hearing on the
defendant's CPL section 440.10 motion. 5o
The defendant was arrested for the murder and robbery of an
employee at a food concession stand. The basis for this arrest was
1. At any time and after entry of a judgment, the court in which it was
entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon
the ground that:
(g) New evidence has been discovered since the entry of a judgment
based upon a verdict of guilty after trial,. . . and which is of such
character as to created a possibility that had such evidence been received
at the trial the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant;
(I) The judgment was obtained in violation of a right of the defendant
under the constitution of this state or of the United States.
Id.
46. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. This provision states in relevant part:
"No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... " Id.
47. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision states in relevant part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
48. Baxley, 84 N.Y.2d 208, 639 N.E.2d 746, 616 N.Y.S.2d 7.
49. In reviewing this case, the court of appeals outlined its authority to
hear this issue on appeal. The court of appeals noted that, historically, this
claim was normally pursued through post judgment review via a writ of error
coram nobis. Id. at 212-13, 639 N.E.2d at 749, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 10 (citing
People v. Silverman, 3 N.Y.2d 200, 144 N.E.2d 10, 165 N.Y.S.2d 11
(1957)).
50. Id.
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the written statements of four informants, Washington, Youmans,
McKinney, and Alston. Each of these informants averred that the
defendant made oral admissions to them concerning his
participation in the crime.51 Washington and McKinney both
testified at trial; their testimony was the primary evidence of the
defendant's guilt.52
Three years and two months after the defendant was convicted
and sentenced, he filed a motion pursuant to CPL section 440.10
to vacate his conviction. 53 Two of the grounds asserted in the
motion were: (1) newly discovered evidence; 54 and (2) the
judgment was obtained in violation of the defendant's state or
federal constitutional rights. 55
The basis for the newly discovered evidence claim was the
recanting of trial testimony by two witnesses, Washington and
McKinney. 56 The court of appeals found that they had no
51. Id. at 210, 639 N.E.2d at 747-48, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 9-10.
52. Id. at 211, 639 N.E.2d at 748, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
53. Id.
54. See N.Y. CR. PRoc. LAW. § 440. 10(l)(g) (McKinney 1994).
55. See N.Y. Cam. PRoc. LAW. § 440.10(1)(h) (McKinney 1994).
56. McKinney's statement consisted of one sentence in which she denied
hearing the defendant make any statements about the murder. Baxiey, 84
N.Y.2d at 211, 639 N.E.2d at 748, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 9. However, McKinney
did not recant her testimony that she saw defendant with a shotgun six months
after the murder. Id. Washington denied that defendant confessed to him and
averred that his trial testimony was fabricated because he was in police custody
at the time, on an unrelated offense, and "believed it was in my best interest to
cooperate with the District Attorney's office." Id.
1995] 807
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authority to disturb the ruling of the trial court on this issue57 and
upheld the denial of defendant's motion without a hearing. 58
The basis for the second ground in Bax.ley's motion was an
affidavit by Youmans which stated that Washington and he were
induced to perjure themselves in return for leniency on their
pending charges. 59 Youmans stated that he notified the
prosecutor about the police coercion before he was scheduled to
testify. 60 Further, Youmans also swore that "[defendant] never
told me or to my knowledge, Michael Washingon, that he killed
Regina Carter. ' 61 The prosecutor did not disclose this statement
to the defense because he believed that the statement was
fabricated. 62 The prosecution decided not to call Youmans to
testify at trial. 63
The supreme court denied the motion without a hearing, 64 and
the appellate division affirmed the judgment and denial of
57. The court of appeals cannot review the denial of a motion to vacate a
judgment on the grounds of newly discovered evidence unless the court has
statutory -authority. See N.Y. CRim. PRoc. LAw §440.10. In People v.
Brown, the court of appeals held that the power to vacate a conviction based
on newly discovered evidence rests within tile discretion of the court. 56
N.Y.2d 242, 246, 436 N.E.2d 1295, 1297, 451 N.Y.S.2d 693, 695 (1972).
This discretion is "unlimited in the lower courts and thus this court has no
power ... to review their exercise of discretion." id. These recantations did
not imply that their prior testimony were caused by police or prosecutorial
misconduct. Baxley, 84 N.Y.2d at 212, 639 N.E.2d at 748-49, 616 N.Y.S.2d
at 9-10.
58. Id. at 212, 639 N.E.2d at 748, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 9. See N.Y. CONST.
art. VI, § 3(a) (stating court's jurisdiction is limited, to "questions of law,
except when the judgment is of death."); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAWV § 470.35
(McKinney 1994) (outlining scope of review of order from intermediate
appellate courts); People v. Crimmins, 38 N.Y.2d 407, 409, 343 N.E.2d 719,
720, 381 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1975) (emphasizing that the court of appeals had no
power to review the discretionary denial of a motion to vacate a conviction
based on newly discovered evidence).
59. Baxley, 84 N.Y.2d at 211, 639 N.E.2d at 748, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 211-12, 639 N.E.2d at 748, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
62. Id. at 212, 639 N.E.2d at 748, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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defendant's motion. 65 Under CPL section 440.30,66 a motion to
vacate a judgment made under section 440.10 may be denied
without a hearing only for specific reasons. 67 The court of
appeals, finding" that none of these reasons existed, 68 held that the
lower courts abused their discretion as a matter of law in denying
defendant's motion without a hearing. 6 9 The court felt that there
was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendant's due
process rights were violated. 70
The New York Court of Appeals has stated that the "concept of
fairness" contained in the State and Federal Due Process Clauses
imposes a duty on the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable
65. 194 A.D.2d. 681, 599 N.Y.S.2d 105 (2d Dep't 1993).
66. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. § 440.30 (McKinney 1994). Section 440.30
states in relevant part:
(4) Upon considering the merits of the motion, the court may deny it
without conducting a hearing if:
(a) The moving papers do not allege any ground constituting legal basis
for the motion; or
(b) The motion is based upon the existence of occurrence of facts and
the moving papers do not contain sworn allegations substantiating
or tending to substantiate all the essential facts, as required by
subdivision one; or
(c) An allegation of fact essential to support the motion is conclusively
refuted by unquestionable documentary proof; or
(d) An allegation of fact essential to support the motion (i) is
contradicted by a court record or other official document, or is
made solely by the defendant and is unsupported by any other
affidavit or evidence, and (ii) under these and all the other
circumstances attending the case, there is on reasonable possibility
that such allegation is true.
Id. Section 440.30 also sets forth the procedure by which to make a motion
pursuant to § 440.10 (motion to vacatejudgment) and § 440.20 (motion to set
aside sentence).
67. N.Y. CalM. PRoc. LAW § 440.30.
68. Baxley, 84 N.Y.2d at 212, 639 N.E.2d at 749, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
The court analyzed each prbvision of § 440.30(4) and found that none of the
situations applied to the instant case. Id. at 214, 639 N.E.2d at 749-50, 616
N.Y.S.2d at 10-11.
69. Id. at 213, 639 N.E.2d at 749, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
70. Id.
19951 809
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to the accused. 7 1 The court also stated that evidence which is
relevant to the dredibility of witnesses falls within this duty. 72
In People v. Vilardi,73 the court of appeals emphasized that the
current standard governing New York courts stems from the
United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Agurs.74 In Agurs, the defendant, charged with second degree
murder, 75 claimed self defense. 7 6 After her conviction, defense
counsel moved for a new trial on the ground that the prosecutor
did not disclose the victim's criminal record to defense counsel. 77
Defendant argued that this evidence would have helped her prove
a self-defense claim by showing that the victim was a "violent-
prone person." 78 The government argued that, in the absence of
71. People v. Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d 490, 496, 517 N.E.2d 219, 222-23, 522
N.Y.S.2d 504, 507-08 (1987) (reasoning that this duiy must exist in order to
"give substance" to a defendant's right to due process).
72. Id. at 496, 517 N.E.2d at 223, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
73. 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d, 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990). The
defendant was arrested and charged with first degree arson, first degree
attempted arson and conspiracy to set off two pipe bombs. Id. at 69-70, 555
N.E.2d at 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518. Before trial, defense counsel requested
"all reports 'by ballistics, firearm and explosive experts' concerning the
Laundromat explosion." Id. at 70, 555 N:E.2d at 916, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
(citation omitted). The defendant was convicted on all counts; on appeal,
defense counsel discovered the existence of a report, used in a coconspirator's
trial, not disclosed by the prosecution. Id.
74. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). The New York courts rely on federal precedent
for rules concerning Brady material. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 85, 555 N.E.2d at
925, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 528 (Simons, J., concurring).
75. The defendant and Sewell checked into a motel. Agurs, 427 U.S. at
99. Sewell was wearing a bowie knife and carrying another knife in his pocket.
Id. Fifteen minutes later, motel employees heard the defendant screaming for
help. Id. Forcing their way into the room, the employees saw Sewell on top of
the defendant, fighting for control of the bowie knife. Id. Sewell died from
stab wounds to his chest and abdomen. Id. at 100. He also had several cuts on
his arms and hands which were thought to be "defensive wounds." Id.
Defendant had "no cuts or bruises of any kind." Id.
76. Id.
77. Sewell had previously pled guilty to assault and carrying a deadly
weapon, in 1963, and to a charge of carrying a deadly weapon, in 1971. Id. at
100-01. In both cases, the deadly weapon was a knife. Id.
78. Id. at 100.
810 [Vol 11
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an appropriate request for such information, the prosecution had
no duty to disclose the victim's prior record. 79
The United States Supreme Court held that, in the absence of a
specific request for the victim's criminal record, the jury verdict
could be reversed only if the new evidence created a "reasonable
doubt" as to the outcome of the trial. 80 If the new evidence could
not create such a reasonable doubt, a new trial would not change
the outcome. 81
In general, the court of appeals is of the opinion that the
standard set forth in Agurs was more appropriate to deal with
both types of situations: those in which prosecutorial bad faith or
negligence is present and those in which such bad faith is not
present. 82 This standard can also deal with a situation where the
defense makes either a general or specific request for evidence. 83
When the defense makes a specific request for evidence, the
failure to make any response is "seldom, if ever, excusable." 84
In cases where defense counsel makes a general request or no
request for Brady material, 85 the prosecutor's failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence violates due process "only if the omitted
evidence creates a reasonable doubt which did not otherwise
exist." 86
79. Id.
80. Id. at 112.
81. Id. at 113.
82. People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 67, 468 N.E.2d 879, 891, 479
N.Y.S.2d 706, 718 (1984) (recognizing that it would be "inappropriate" to
apply the same standard of review when a prosecutor suppresses evidence, and
when a prosecutor fails to disclose information due to a generalized request
from defense counsel).
83. People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 74, 555 N.E.2d 915, 918, 556
N.Y.S.2d 518, 521 (1990).
84. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
85. Brady material is "evidence both favorable to the accused and material
to the issue of guilt or punishment." United States v. Endicott, 803 F.2d 506
(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 989 (1990), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
456 (1993).
86. Smith, 63 N.Y.S.2d at 67, 468 N.E.2d at 891, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
Had the request been made specifically for such information, the court would
have granted a new trial if there was a "reasonable possibility" that the
1995]
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In analyzing the defendant's contentions, the court found that
Youman's statements were not insufficient as a matter of law to
constitute exculpatory material under Brady.87  Youman's
affidavit, if true, would have constituted exculpatory evidence
because it impeached Washington, one of the prosecution's main
witnesses. However, because Baxley's defense attorney only
made a general request for Brady material, the standard of review
on remand is whether the withheld evidence creates a "reasonable
doubt" which did not previously exist.8 8
The federal standard for determining a prosecutor's duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence was set forth in Brady v.
Maryland.89 In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that
a prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence favorable to the
accused, where such evidence is "material either to guilt or to
punishment," violates a person's right to due process. 90
In Brady, the Court found that the defendant's due process
rights were violated when the prosecution failed to disclose a
statement made by an accomplice, tried separately, in which the
defendant would not have been convicted. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 77, 555
N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
87. N.Y. CRhim. PRoc. LAW § 440.30(4)(a)&(b) (McKinney 1994). The
court also found that these allegations did not fall under sections (4)(c)&(d)(i)-
(d)(ii). Therefore, the supreme court had no authority under § 440.30 to deny
defendant's motion without a hearing. Baxley, 84 N.Y.2d at 214, 639 N.E.2d
at 750, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
88. In remitting the case to the supreme court of New York for a hearing
on defendant's motion, the hearing court must determine whether Youmans in
fact communicated Brady material to the prosecutor which was not disclosed to
the defense. Baxley, 84 N.Y.2d at 214, 639 N.E.2d at 750, 616 N.Y.S.2d at
11. If the court finds that Brady material was communicated to the prosecutor,
and the evidence "creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist," the
judgment of conviction must be vacated and the defendant ordered a new trial.
Id. (following Agurs standard for review in absence of specific request by
defense).
89. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Defendant was tried, found guilty of first degree
murder, and sentenced to death. Id. at 84. In preparing for trial, defendant's
counsel requested to examine his coconspirator's extrajudicial statements. Id.
One of these statements, in which the coconspirator admitted to committing the
homicide, was withheld from defense counsel until after his conviction and his
sentence were affirmed. Id.
90. Id. at 87.
[Vol 11
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accomplice admitted to doing the actual killing. 91 The defense
made a specific request for all such statemients made by the
accomplice.92
In niodifying Brady, the Supreme Court stated in United States
v. Bagley,93 that the purpose of a rule requiring prosecutors to
disclose exculpatory information is not to make the defense
attorney's job easier, but "to ensure that a miscarriage of justice
does not occur." 94
In Bagley, the prosecution did not disclose that two witnesses
who worked for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
signed contracts which gave them three hundred dollars in
exchange for their work in obtaining evidence and testifying
against the defendant. 95 Defense counsel argued in his motion to
vacate the judgment that the prosecution's failure to disclose
these contracts, in response to the defense's specific request for
such documents, 96 violated the defendant's due process rights
under Brady.97 The Supreme Court held that evidence not
disclosed to the defense is material "only if 'there is a reasonable
91. Id. at 84. The determination of whether a defendant's due process
rights have been violated is not affected by a finding of good faith or bad faith
on the part of the prosecutor. Id. at 87. "The principle.., is not punishment
of society for the misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to
the accused." Id.
92. Id. at 84. Although the Supreme Court fbund that Brady's right to due
process had been violated; the Court remanded the case for retrial solely on the
issue of punishment. Id. at 88. Brady's counsel conceded that his client was
guilty of murder in the first degree. Id. at 84. Counsel was asking the jury not
to give his client the death penalty. Id. The Supreme Court decided that even if
the confession was admitted, it could not have reduced Brady's crime below
that of murder in the first degree. Id. Therefbre, Brady was not prejudiced by
a retrial solely on punishment. Id. at 88.
93. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
94. Id. at 675 (replacing standard fbrmulated in United States v. Agurs).
95. Id. at 671.
96. Defense counsel requested, inter alia, "[t]he prior criminal records of
witnesses, and any deals, promises or inducements made to witnesses in
exchange for their testimony." Id. at 669-70.
97. See supra note 89.
1995]
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probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different."98
At the present time, the New York Court of Appeals has not
adopted the standard set forth in Bagley. Although they have had
ample opportunity to do so, the court continues to adhere to the
standard set forth in Agurs. In evaluating New York's perspective
on due process, the court of appeals places a stronger emphasis
on having the evidence presented to the jury at trial, whereas the
federal system relies more on post-trial appellate proceedings.
New York courts believe that in this situation, the jury has made
a less-informed determination of the defendant's guilt or
innocence. 99 This standard also provides less incentive for the
prosecutor to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence to the
defense. The stricter New York rule places a greater significance
on a prosecutor's decision to disclose or withhold evidence. By
raising the stakes, most prosecutors will err on the side of caution
in disclosing borderline information. 100 The court also takes into
account the ambiguity of the standard as evidenced by the lack of
a clear rationale behind the Bagley rule. 101
Both the New York State and Federal Constitutions recognize a
defendant's right to a fair trial as being incorporated into the right
98. 473 U.S. at 682 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
682 (1984) (emphasis added)). The witness' testimony was given primarily on
the firearms charges. The defendants were acquitted of these charges at trial.
Id. at 673. The Court found that the use of the contracts to impeach th6
witnesses "would not have been helpful." Id. In its opinion, the Court
recognized that this standard treats evidence suppressed in bad faith the same
as when there is no bad faith; however, the Court reasoned that this can be
factored into the totality of the circumstances analysis. Id. at 683.
99. People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 77-78, 555 N.E.2d, 915, 920, 556
N.Y.S.2d 518, 523 (1990) (explaining New York's reliance on United States
v. Agurs).
100. Id. at 77, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
101. The court looked at the fact that it was a plurality opinion in which no
more than three justices agreed on the reasoning behind the court's holding and
five justices felt that there should be a distinction between general and specific
requests. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 74 n.4, 555 N.E.2d at 918 n.4, 556 N.Y.S.2d
at 521 n.4.
[Vol 11
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of due process. 102 Both courts have the same goal of
discouraging prosecutors from withholding exculpatory evidence
and ensuring that criminal defendants have a fair trial. However,
New York courts have implemented a higher burden for
prosecutors to meet in analyzing the failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence. As a result, defendants will have a
relatively easier burden of proof by pursuing a violation of a state
constitutional right to due process in a motion to vacate a
criminal conviction. The federal rule focuses more on the
materiality of the evidence and less on the actions of the
prosecutor.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Douglas1 0 3
(decided October 27, 1994)
Defendant appealed his conviction of criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the fifth degree, in violation of New York
Penal Law section 220.06 (5).104 Defendant made a motion for
the court to review his conviction and retroactively apply the
scienter requirement to the weight element, as enunciated in the
subsequent decision of People v. Ryan. 105 Defendant claimed that
the state's evidence was insufficient. 10 6 He asserted that the jury
should have been precluded from finding him guilty since the
102. People v. Cwikla, 46 N.Y.2d 434, 441, 386 N.E.2d 1070, 1073, 414
N.Y.S.2d 102, 105 (1979) (recognizing prosecutor's obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence as "fundamental") (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963)).
103. 205 A.D.2d 280, 617 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1st Dep't 1994).
104. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 220.06 (McKinney 1989).
105. 82 N.Y.2d 497, 626 N.E.2d 51, 605 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1993). The
defendant was tried more than a year befbre 1)'an was decided. Douglas, 205
A.D.2d at 282, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
106. Douglas, 205 A.D.2d at 283, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
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